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finds its way into the public sector for its best interests, it may be
reasonably presumed the Court would examine closely any statute
taxing the churches.
CharlotteRolston

Due Process of LawWelfare Recipient's Right to Pre-termination Hearing
A New York City Department of Social Service' procedure
allowed welfare officials to discontinue assistance to welfare recipients without a hearing prior to the termination of benefits.' If
a caseworker questioned a recipient's continued eligibility, he discussed the matter with the recipient. The caseworker could then
recommend termination to a unit supervisor, who, if he concurred,
forwarded a letter to the recipient stating the justification for the
proposed termination. The recipient was then permitted to request
review by a higher official and to support this request with a written
statement. If the reviewing official affirmed the action assistance
stopped immediately, and the recipient was informed by letter of
the reasons for the action. Twenty New York City welfare recipients challenged the constitutionality of these procedures on the
grounds they violated due process in that the procedures lacked any
provision for personal appearance or oral presentation of evidence
before the reviewing official and denied the recipient the right to
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. A three-judge federal
district court held that only a pre-termination evidentiary hearing
would satisfy the requirements of due process.2
On appeal, 3 the United States Supreme Court in Goldberg v.
Kelly and its companion case Wheeler v. Montgomery' held, in a
5-3 decision,' that due process of law requires an adequate hearing
4

I New York City Department of Social Services Procedure No. 68-18,
implementing N. Y. Social Welfare Law § 351.26(b) (McKinney 1966).
2 Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
3
Prob. juris. noted sub nom. Goldberg v. Kelly, 394 U.S. 971 (1969).
4 397 U.S. 254 (1970), affg 294 F. Supp. 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
5 397 U.S. 280 (1970). In Wheeler a three-judge federal district court in
California held that the opportunity for an informal conference with a caseworker before termination of benefits, coupled with a trial-type hearing
subsequent
to termination, satisfied due process.
6
Majority opinion by Justice Brennan in which Douglas, J., Harlan, J.,
White, J., and Marshall, J., concurred. Justice Black dissented in a separate
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prior to termination of welfare benefits. Without this hearing an
eligible recipient might be deprived of the means to survive while
seeking legitimate redress from the welfare bureaucracy.
The Goldberg v. Kelly decision has three areas of tremendous
significance: First, it tolls the death knell for right-privilege analysis
as a valid test for determining whether governmental benefits can
be terminated without a prior administrative hearing and adopts a
more sophisticated balancing of interests test to determine the
necessity for this prior hearing; second, it applies this balancing test
to cases of welfare termination or reduction to conclude that due
process of law requires a prior hearing consonant with certain procedural due process requirements; third, it could have far-reaching
impact in analogous areas of administrative action as precedent
for the requirement of a prior hearing in the termination of governmental benefits.
I. The Old and New Tests of Administrative Due Process
A. The Old Right-PrivilegeAnalysis

The venerable right-privilege analysis was the test used by
the courts in determining whether governmental benefits could be
terminated without a prior administrative hearing. If the court
found a right to be involved then due process required an administrative hearing prior to termination. On the other hand if the court
found a mere privilege to be involved then due process did not
require an administrative hearing prior to termination. Mr. Justice
Holmes, speaking for the Massachusetts Supreme Court in 1892,
tersely expressed the prevalent attitude of the courts in dismissing
a policeman's petition to force the city of New Bedford to reinstate
him following his dismissal for violation of a rule prohibiting
members of the force from becoming members of a political committee: "The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk
politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman."'
In this environment "[t]he law of social welfare grew up on the
theory that welfare is a 'gratuity' [synonymous with 'privilege' in
right-privilege analysis] furnished by the state, and thus may be
opinion. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart dissented in separate
opinions offered in the companion case of Wheeler v. Montgomery.
7 McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517,
517 (1892). See also Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 39 N.E. 113

(1895), aff'd, 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
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made subject to whatever conditions the state sees fit to impose."8
This rationale expanded to encompass a wide area of governmental
activity and to serve as justification for the summary termination
of a whole spectrum of government-dispensed "privileges"."
In Goldberg v. Kelly the Court finally placed aside the rightprivilege dichotomy, saying "the constitutional challenge cannot
be answered by an argument that public assistance benefits are a
'privilege' and not a 'right'." 1 If a person is qualified for welfare
benefits, "[s]uch benefits are a matter of statutory entitlement"
and "relevant constitutional restraints apply. . .to the withdrawal of
public assistance benefits... ."" Several prior cases have discarded
the right-privilege doctrine in determining the relevant constitutional
restraints in other areas of government activity by rejecting the
distinction in cases dealing with tax exemptions, 2 public employment,' 3 a license to practice law,' 4 social security benefits, 5 unemployment compensation,'" and public housing. 7 Right-privilege thus
meets its ultimate rejection in the instant case and in Shapiro v.
Thompson, both dealing with public assistance.' 8 The majority
8
RrzcH, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal
Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1255 (1965).
9 See, e.g., Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S.
886 (1961) (summary dismissal of civilian cook on military installation);
Barsky v. Board of Regents 347 U.S. 442 (1954) (suspension of physician's
license on basis of criminal conviction of contempt of Congress without a
showing that his actions related to his competence or professional integrity);
Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U.S. 918 (1951) (summary dismissal of a federal
civil servant from a nonsensitive position on grounds of suspected disloyalty);
Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927) (dismissal of a public
school teacher for violating a statutory ban on the teaching of "any theory
that denies the story of the divine creation"). See also VAN ALSTYN,
The
Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv.
L. REv. 1439 (1968); Hirschman v. Los Angeles County, 39 Cal. 2d 698,
249 P.2d 287 (1952); Hornsteim v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm'n, 412
Ill. 365, 106 N.E.2d 354 (1952); Wilkie v. O'Conner, 261 App. Div. 373, 25
N.Y.S.2d 617 (1941); Starkey v. Board of Educ., 14 Utah 2d 227, 381 P.2d
718 (1963).
10 397 U.S. at 262 (1970). The Court here was directly quoting the often
cited footnote six of Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969).
Shapiro v. Thompson declared the residency requirements for qualification
for public assistance unconstitutional.
" 397 U.S. at 262.
12 Spieser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
'3 Slowchower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
14 Spevach v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
Is Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
16 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
17 Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 386 U.S. 670 (1967).
18 See note 10 supra. See also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
The Court in Sherbert v. Verner decided that the disqualification of appellant
for unemployment compensation benefits, solely because of her refusal to
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opinion further intimates that, even if right-privilege analysis did
apply, welfare assistance would be more akin to property [a right]
than a gratuity [a privilege]. 19 This line of reasoning has been

espoused by Yale law professor Charles Reich, a leading proponent
of the theory that governmental largess should be treated as a kind
of "new property". Professor Reich believes that much of today's
wealth results from government-dispensed largess (subsidies, licenses,

pensions, contracts, employment, public assistance, etc.), and to the
recipients of these benefits, they are not luxuries or privileges, but

are essentials to aid in the security and independence of the individual
receiving them. Moreover, to Reich these entitlements should "be
governed by a system of regulation plus civil or criminal sanctions,
rather than a system based upon denial, suspension and revocation."2
Although not going so far as to hold government-dispensed largess
a "new property", lower federal courts, in certain kinds of cases, had
also rejected the right-privilege distinction as the determinant of

whether relevant constitutional restraints apply to the termination of
reduction of governmental benefits.2
Although the Federal courts seem to have rejected rightprivilege analysis, the West Virginia Supreme Court continues to
use it to differentiate between those state dispensed benefits which
will or will not be protected by a hearing prior to termination. In
Densmore v. County Court of Mercer County,22 a 1928 case inaccept employment in which she would have to work on Saturday contrary
to her religious beliefs, imposed an unconstitutional burden on the free
exercise of her religion. The Court noted "It is too late in the day to doubt
that the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial
of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege." Id. at 404.
19Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970).
20 REicu, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 785 (1964). Mr. Justice
Black, in his dissent, was critical of this property right argument. "It somewhat
strains credulity to say that a government's promise of charity to an individual
is property belonging to that individual when the Government denies that the
individual is honestly entitled to receive such a payment." Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 275 (1970).
21 E.g., Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964) (qualified applicant for liquor license entitled to notice and a hearing to determine reason
for refusal); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied 368 U.S. 930 (1961) (due process requires a notice and some
opportunity for hearing before a student at a tax-supported college can be
expelled for misconduct); Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228 (S.D. W. Va.
1968), afjd. per curiam 399 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1968) cert. denied, 394 U.S.
905 (1969) (students entitled to hearing prior to dismissal from college for
violently protesting college policies); Knight. v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F.
Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961) (student entitled to notice and an opportunity
to be22heard before dismissal for misconduct).
Densmore v. County Court of Mercer County, 106 W. Va. 317, 145
S.E. 641 (1928).
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volving an appeal from the summary termination of a mother's pension (the forerunner of the present AFDC program), the Court
noted that "[i]t is an established rule that a pension, such as the
one here, is a mere gratuity [privilege] in which the pensioner has no
vested legal right, and which is terminable without notice, at the
23
will of the state."
Two other West Virginia cases neatly illustrate how the court
has employed the right-privilege doctrine to determine whether due
process of law requires a hearing prior to termination. When a
"right" is the subject of adjudication, due process requires a hearing;
when a privilege is involved, due process does not require a hearing.
Nutter v. State Road Commission 4 held that a license to drive
cars was a "privilege" and could be revoked "without notice or an
opportunity to be heard," while State ex rel. Ellis v. Kelly"5 held
that a license to sell cars was a "right" entitled to the protections of
a hearing "consistent with due process."
As recently as 1969, the West Virginia Court availed itself
of right-privilege analysis to dismiss an appeal from members of a
teachers' retirement system in Taylor v. Cabell County Board of
6 The Court
Education."
upheld a decision by the defendant Board
of Education to change a formula by which the plaintiffs had previously been paid retirement benefits from a noncontributory supplemental pension plan. Under the new formula the payment of benefits from the fund would be completely discontinued or greatly
reduced in amount. In classic right-privilege fashion the Court
upheld the new formula, stating: "[A]ccording to the clear weight
of authority, a pensioner in a noncontributory pension or retirement
plan or system, as here, has a vested right only to payments which
have accrued and which can not be changed or diminished but
does not have a vested right to future payments which may be
changed or diminished in amount at any time."2 Taylor cited
Densmore and other precedent holding that a pension is a bounty
[read "privilege"] granted by the state and terminable as it sees fit.
However, the decision would probably have been the same had the
court rejected the simplistic right-privilege analysis in favor of a more
sophisticated balancing of interests test.
2

3

24

25
26

27

Id. at 319, 145 S.E. at 641.
119 W. Va. 312, 193 S.E. 549 (1937).
145 W. Va. 70, 74, 112 S.E.2d 641, 644 (1960).
152 W. Va. 761, 166 S.E.2d 150 (1969).
1d. at 773, 166 S.E.2d at 157 (emphasis added).
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B. The New Test of Administrative Due ProcessBalancingof Interests

The Court in Goldberg v. Kelly abandoned the traditional confines of right-privilege analysis in which the denomination of "right"
or "privilege" controlled the protections afforded the individual from
summary termination of government-dispensed benefits. A more
realistic balancing test requiring an examination of the relative
interests of the parties involved was adopted. The eligible recipient's
interests in continued welfare were identified by the court and
weighed against the state's interest in summary adjudication.
Welfare assistance provides the very means of survival; it means
food, clothing, shelter, medicine, 8 and a change for participation in
community life. "At the same time, welfare guards against the
societal malaise that may flow from a widespread sense of unjustified
frustration and insecurity." 9 When the state terminates the aid of
an eligible recipient, "[H]is situation becomes immediately desperate.
His need to concentrate upon finding the means for daily subsistence,
in turn, adversely affects his ability to seek redress from the welfare
bureaucracy. '""°
The state interest advanced to counterbalance those of the
recipient is that summary termination procedures aid in "conserving
fiscal and administrative resources."'" Less time, money and manpower are required to administer a system based on the automatic
termination of benefits upon discovery of a reason to believe that a
recipient is no longer eligible for aid than it does to accord that
individual a pre-termination hearing. The Court agreed that the
balance swings toward summary adjudication in a very narrow line
of cases where the circumstances disclose a compelling state interest.
This involves cases where "[d]rastic administrative action is sometimes essential to take care of problems that cannot be allowed to
wait for the completion of formal proceedings." 3 Usually in these
cases the state interest involved is the protection of the health and
welfare of the citizenry. Thus the courts have approved the summary
seizure of a mislabeled vitamin product,33 adoption of wartime price
28 Under most state welfare assistance programs eligible recipients are
also entitled to free medical service and medicine.
29 397 U.S. at 265.

30
31

d. at
Id.
at 264.
265.

32 1 K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.08 at 438 (1958).
33 Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950).
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controls, " seizure and destruction of food not fit for human use,3"
and the revocation of a doctor's surgical privileges for the safety
of a patient. 6
In this balancing process between the interest of the welfare
recipient and the interest of the state, there is no such compelling state
interest present to outweigh the eligible recipient's interest in the
uninterrupted receipt of welfare. The recipient's survival pending
outcome of his appeal outweighs the state's need to conserve and
guard the fisc. 7
II. The New Test Applied
Applying the newly adopted balancing test, the Court concluded
that the recipient was entitled to a hearing prior to termination of
welfare benefits. The Court relied upon analogous precedent as
well as a definitive survey of the respective interests of the parties.
The Court first noted that in the case of Londoner v. City &
County of Denver""an abutting landowner had a right to be heard
prior to the assessment of a street improvement tax becoming irrevoc9
ably fixed. Likewise Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator"
upheld a minimum wage order on the grounds that the demands of
due process were met by an administrative hearing held before the
final order became effective. The eligible recipient's destitute situation distinguishes him from the landowner in Londoner and the
corporation in Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. When welfare is discontinued,
only a hearing prior to termination provides the recipient with procedural due process, the crucial factor being that termination of aid
pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive
an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he
waits. 40
In addition to stating that the hearing must be prior to termination, the Court particularized the essential elements of procedural
34Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
35 North Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908).
36 Coach v. State, 165 So.2d 426 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
37 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970). Mr. Justice Black, in
dissent, argued that the balancing test proposed by the majority is unrealistic
and could lead to further governmental expense ("full judicial review") since
in any weighing process between the government's pocketbook and the
recipient's survival the balance must always tip in. favor of the individual.
397 U.S. at 278.
38210 U.S. 373 (1908). See also Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ.,
294 F.2d
150 (5th Cir. 1961).
9
3
312 U.S. 126 (1941).
40
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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due process.4 ' These were: (a) timely and adequate notice detailing
the reasons for the proposed termination; (b) an effective opportunity to defend by confronting any adverse witnesses with oral arguments and evidence; (c) disclosure of the evidence used to prove
the state's case; (d) the right to be heard by counsel retained by the
recipient; (e) a decision resting soley on the legal rules and evidence
brought forth at the hearing; and (f) an impartial decision maker.
The Court expressly stated that the hearing need not take the form
of a judicial or quasi-judicial trial and that minimal procedural
safeguards would suffice.4" Not required were: (a) a complete
record or a comprehensive opinion; (b) a particular order of proof
or mode of offering evidence; (c) absence of prior involvement in
some aspects of the case by the decision maker; and (d) counsel
provided for the recipient by the welfare agencies.
Pursuant to the guidelines established by Goldberg v. Kelly,
the West Virginia Department of Welfare has promulgated the new
West Virginia Hearings and Appeals Procedures.43 The new procedures appear to be in accord with the procedural due process
particulars required in the pre-termination hearing. However, in
a few of these regulations revision would make the protection
afforded the claimant more in accord with the spirit of the Goldberg
v. Kelly decision.
The new West Virginia procedures provide for written notification to the recipient of the reasons for the proposed termination of
his assistance and his right to a pre-termination hearing, but they
leave the necessity for an oral explanation of these reasons to the
discretion of the caseworker.4 4 Although this manner of notification
is adequate, the Court in Goldberg v. Kelly implies that a letter and
a personal conference ("the most effective method of communicating
with recipients") would be preferable to the single letter,4" especially
in view of the higher rate of illiteracy among the poor. Much of
4,
42

id. at 267-271.

at 266-267.
Hearings and Appeals Procedures, West Virginia Department of
Welfare (July 1, 1970). These procedures were issued by Commissioner
Edwin F. Flowers to all administrative, supervisory, service and eligibility
staff members of the West Virginia Department of Welfare in a letter dated
29, 1970.
June 44
1d. at § 700.4. "It is the responsibility of the Worker to provide this
information to the client in writing and if necessary for better understanding,
in an oral manner...."
45397 U.S. at 268.
43

1d.
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the welfare recipient's confusion, doubt, reticence and fear of the
hearing procedure could be eliminated by a personal interview.
Under the new regulations a claimant may review his medical
records with the examining physician; however, this section ends
with the caveat that "[M]edical information shall not be shared with
the claimant without the physician's approval". "6 In cases where the
medical information goes to the very determination of eligibility,4 '
the refusal by (or the unavailability of) the physician to share the
information with the claimant would seem to conflict directly with
the Court's mandate that the recipient be provided with disclosure
of "the evidence used to prove the Government's case." 4
One last feature provided by the new regulations, the right to
counsel, although completely in accord with Goldberg v. Kelly,
merits further examination. While the Supreme Court has upheld
the indigent's right to appointed counsel in cases possibly resulting
in criminal sanctions involving incarceration, as in Gideon v. Wainwright,49 Douglas v. California,0 Mempa v. Rhay' and In re
Gault,52 it has been reluctant to extend this right to civil cases or
administrative proceedings. The Court feels that the requirements
of due process in civil cases and administrative proceedings are
satisfied by according the individual a right to counsel at his own
expense. Neither Goldberg v. Kelly nor the West Virginia hearings
regulations expands this right to appointed counsel to the pre-termination hearing, although both provide for a right to counsel. 3 The
Court in Goldberg v. Kelly recognized the importance of the right
to counsel and of counsel's role to "[h]elp delineate the issues,
present the factual contentions in an orderly manner, conduct crossexamination and generally safeguard the interest of the recipient."54
46

Hearings and Appeals Procedures, West Virginia Department of
Welfare
47 § 700.4 (1970).
Certain welfare programs such as Aid to the Blind and Aid to the
Disabled require the applicant to prove by a physical examination that he is
qualified for the program.
48 397 U.S. at 270.
49 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to appointed counsel for felony cases).
50 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (right to appointed counsel for appellate review).
5, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (right to appointed counsel at revocation of
probation proceeding).

52 387 U.S. 1 (1967)
(right to appointed counsel at juvenile proceedings
which may result in commitment).
5- 397 U.S. at 267. Hearings and Appeals Procedures, West Virginia Department of Welfare § 720.3(d) (1970). The claimant "[hias the right to be
represented by counsel, legal or otherwise at his own expense .

54

397 U.S. at 270-71.
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Yet it seems to have disregarded its own observation in Gideon v.
Wainwright that the right to counsel is a meaningless one for indigents
since these people are too poor to hire their own advocates. Welfare
recipients are receiving governmental assistance because they are
destitute. Welfare provides the means to survive, not the means to
retain counsel. An HEW regulation to be effective July 1, 1970,
would have provided this free legal aid for the welfare hearing
through legal service projects under OEO, Legal Aid, or other
organizations making legal services available.55 Shortly after the
Goldberg v. Kelly decision, however, this regulation was repealed.56
As Justice Douglas stated, dissenting in Hackin v. Arizona," "If
true equal protection of the law is to be realized, an indigent must
be able to obtain assistance when he suffers a denial of his rights.
Today, this goal is only a goal."
The alternatives to a right to appointed counsel provide little
hope for the indigent recipient in his welfare hearing. The claimant
can be his own advocate and attempt to decipher the myriad departmental regulations, instructions and notices that often baffle even the
well-trained expert. "[T]he prosecution of an appeal demands a
degree of security, awareness, tenacity, and ability which few dependent people have."5 " The claimant may also rely on the state
welfare agency to protect his interests (the same interests that the
Supreme Court has seen fit to protect from the arbitrary and
capricious action of the same welfare agency), or he may rely on the
knowledge of self-ordained lay "experts." The lay "expert" often
has at most a marginal grasp of the subject matter of the proceeding,
and has little, if any, experience or training in adversary proceedings.
55 45 C.F.R. § 205.10, 34 Fed. Reg. 1144 (1969). See also Department
of Health, Education and Welfare, Social and Rehabilitation Service, State
Letter No. 1053 (November 8, 1968). This letter from Mary Switzer,
Administrator of Social and Rehabilitation Service, contained principles for
establishing legal services programs for public welfare clients by the states on
a matching fund basis, with the state retaining the option of participation.
Admitting that "[rlural areas suffer from a particular dearth of free legal
service for poor people" and that HEW is committed to the concept of "Equal
Justice for All", the letter went on to urge the state agencies "to move ahead
as quickly as possible to establish legal services programs ... "
S6 Department of Health, Education and Welfare Proposed Regulations,
45 C.F.R. Ch. 2, Parts 205, 206, and 220, 35 Fed. Reg. 8448, revising § 205.10
(May 29, 1970).
57 389 U.S. 143, 145 (1967).
58
WEDEMEYR & MooR, The American Welfare System, 54 CALIF. L.
REV. 326, 342 (1966).
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III. Conclusion
Goldberg v. Kelly dealt the fatal blow to right-privilege analysis
as a valid test for determining whether or not certain constitutional
restraints apply to the termination of governmental largess and utilized
a balancing of interests test as a more viable determination of the
protections to be afforded an individual against arbitrary governmental action. This case has already been employed as precedent
for an action to apply the right to a prior hearing to the termination
of unemployment compensation,59 and it requires little imagination
to envision further suits challenging the termination of other government benefits without a prior hearing. As a possible case in point
for the application of the Court's proposed balancing test, the recent
incident involving the summary suspension of a state purchasing
director might serve as an example."' The purchasing director who
was under Civil Service, was suspended from his job without a prior
hearing because of a grand jury indictment on the charge of bribery,
even though the indictment was subsequently dropped. The balance
would be weighed on the one side by the individual's interest in
retaining his employment and salary and the state's interest in not
wrongfully suspending an employee, and on the other side by the
state's interest in the summary suspension of an alleged wrongdoer.
The interest of the individual would be loss of earnings and
possible damage to reputation with resultant difficulty in obtaining
other employment. Although probably not destitute, as is the welfare
recipient, the employee would need to live on accumulated resources
pending outcome of a later hearing. The interests of the state in not
wrongfully suspending an employee are twofold: first, it tends to
destroy the value of job security as a part of the total wage package
in attracting qualified personnel into government service; second, it
runs contrary to society's abiding belief that a person is innocent
until proven guilty. A grand jury indictment is in no way considered
dispositive of guilt or innocence.
Against these interests must be weighed the counter-vailing
interest of the state in the summary suspension of an alleged wrongdoer--conservation of fiscal resources. The amount of harm that
can result to the state fiscal resources would be a factor of the
5
9 California Dept. of Human Resources Dev. v. Java (N.D. Cal. 1970),
rev. granted, 39 U.S.L.W. 3177 (U.S. Oct. 26, 1970).
60 Charleston Daily Mail, Oct. 7, 1970, at 1, col. 1.
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sensitivity of the position and the seriousness or type of charge
alleged. The alleged malingering of a state road worker is not as
serious as the alleged misuse of a high government position for
personal gain. Another state interest would be the added expense
necessary to pay the individual pending outcome of the hearing,
although this can be minimized by increasing the efficiency of the
hearing procedure, or by possible action to recoup any salary paid
between notification of the hearing and the final determination that
the suspension was justified. The Court would then have to weigh
these conflicting interests to determine whether a hearing prior to
suspension of government employment was required.
The Court's decision in Goldberg v. Kelly provided the welfare
recipient with protection against the arbitrary and capricious discontinuance of welfare assistance by affording the recipient the constitutional right to a pre-termination evidentiary hearing entailing the right
to timely and adequate notice, the right to confront adverse witnesses
with oral arguments and evidence, the right to disclosure of the
evidence used to prove the government's case, and the right to an
impartial decision resting on the legal rules and evidence brought
forth at the hearing. "To shelter the solitary human spirit does not
merely make possible the fulfillment of individuals; it also gives
society the power to change, to grow, and to regenerate, and hence to
endure."'" Goldberg v. Kelly provided a measure of this shelter.
Michael A. Albert

Property-Right of Re-Entry-Descent and Alienability
On January 13, 1821, Noah Zane made a deed granting a certain parcel of land to the City of Wheeling, West Virginia. In the
deed the grantor Zane reserved a right of re-entry' if the city ceased
to use the land as a "market house." In 1964 the City discontinued
the use of the property as a "market house", at which time the
heirs of Noah Zane exercised the right of re-entry and entered and
took possession of the land. A short time later the city instituted
a proceeding of eminent domain against the grantor's heirs and again
acquired ownership of the property.
REicH, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J., 733, 787 (1964).
' A power of termination (right of re-entry) is a future interest
left in the transferor or his successor in interest on the transfer of
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